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RETROACTIVITY AND CRACK SENTENCING REFORM
Harold J. Krent*

This Article argues that the strong presumption against retroactive application of
reduced punishments articulated in the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Dorsey v.
United States, is neither historically grounded nor constitutionally compelled. Although not dispositive in Dorsey, the presumption may mislead legislatures in
future contexts, whether addressing marijuana decriminalization or lessened punishment for file sharing, and in no way should signal to Congress that future
changes should apply prospectively only.
Although the Court reached the right result in applying the reduction in punishment for crack offenses to offenders whose sentences had not been finalized, the
Court relied excessively on the general Savings Statute enacted in 1871. Congress
enacted that statute not to discourage retroactive decriminalization or diminution
in punishment, but to avoid the consequence of abating pending prosecutions and
penalties that, at common law, followed from alteration of a criminal statute. Congress wished to prevent release of offenders when it recodified a law or increased the
punishment for an offense without explicitly specifying that prosecutions could continue under the former enactment. The Savings Statute currently should be
understood as a default in the face of congressional silence; once it is clear that
Congress considered the temporal scope of its action, the presumption should
disappear.
The Article next explores whether alternative justifications support a strong presumption for prospective application of any legislative change. It initially turns to
the norm against retroactive lawmaking. The conventional reasons for distrusting
retroactive measures have little applicability in the context of legislative amelioration of punishment. The Article then considers two separation of powers concerns
that might justify a rule against retroactive application of congressional leniency:
first, whether Congress’s reduction of sentences would interfere with the President’s
pardon authority under Article II, and second, whether Congress lacks the power to
undo a final decision of the judiciary. The constitutional arguments raise no serious barrier to retroactive application of congressional leniency.
On the other hand, the Article rejects the notion that Congress, in light of equal
protection principles, must benefit those who previously committed the offense. To be
sure, ignoring the plight of prior offenders may seem grossly unfair, and deterrence
is not a justifiable reason to treat similarly situated offenders so disparately. Nonetheless, the Article argues that retribution and institutional rationales can justify
the differential punishment scheme and survive equal protection scrutiny.
*
Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Chris
Buccafusco, Rick Hasen, Todd Haugh, Mark Rosen, and Chris Schmidt for comments on
earlier drafts.

53

54

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 47:1

In short, because there are no compelling policy or constitutional grounds to presume that congressional leniency should apply prospectively only, Congress should
be accorded the discretion to determine where to draw the line in determining the
proper amount of retribution for those who committed offenses before the decriminalization or diminution in punishment.

INTRODUCTION
The racially tinged controversy over the disparities in sentencing
between crack and powder cocaine finally received a Supreme
Court audience in Dorsey v. United States.1 There, the Court considered the retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),2
which reduced the punishment for many crack offenses.3 Congress,
however, did not explicitly specify which group(s) of offenders
would benefit from the reduced punishment—those previously sentenced, those whose sentences had yet to become final, or only
those committing offenses after the FSA went into effect.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in Dorsey held that Congress intended
the new sentencing law to apply to the latter two groups.4 In so
doing, the divided Court permitted thousands of crack offenders to
benefit from the shortened sentences, which the dissenters argued
should only have applied more narrowly to those committing offenses post enactment.5 Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling left tens if
not hundreds of thousands of those previously sentenced for crack
offenses to languish behind bars for the duration of their original
sentences, including those who committed the covered offenses on
the very same day as Mr. Dorsey.
This Article considers the constitutional and policy ramifications
at stake in determining the scope of congressional leniency. Dorsey
affirms a presumption in favor of prospective application of legislative measures reducing punishment, which was overcome in the
FSA context only by a combination of relatively unique factors
pointing to a congressional expectation that the new Act would apply to offenders whose sentences had not been finalized. Although
not dispositive in Dorsey, the presumption against retroactive application of ameliorative punishment may prove pernicious in future
cases in which individuals seek to benefit from other sentencing
1.
132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).
2.
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
3.
See 75 Fed. Reg. 66,188, 66,190–93 (2010). The FSA reduced “the crack-to-powder
cocaine disparity from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1.” Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2326. Congress determined
that crack was not as harmful as previously thought. See id. at 2328–29.
4.
Id. at 2335.
5.
See id. at 2339–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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changes, such as with the recent decriminalization of marijuana
possession in Washington and Colorado,6 or with possible future
reduction in punishment for file sharing. The presumption in no
way should signal to Congress a normative preference for prospective application; in many contexts, Congress should extend the
benefits of diminished punishment to those previously sentenced.
Indeed, in the crack context, why should prior offenders remain
incarcerated under what Congress itself deemed unjustifiably long
sentences?
This Article argues that the presumption against retroactive application of reduced punishments reflected in Dorsey is neither
historically grounded nor constitutionally compelled. The majority
opinion,7 and even more so the dissent,8 inordinately relied on the
general Savings Statute enacted in 1871.9 The Savings Statute embraced an interpretive principle that future congressional changes
(not just reductions) in penalties would apply prospectively in the
absence of a clear statement.10 Congress, however, enacted the measure not to prevent retroactive decriminalization or diminution in
punishment, but to avoid the consequence of abating pending
prosecutions and penalties that, at common law, followed from alteration of a criminal statute.11 Congress wished to avoid the bizarre
consequence of offenders walking free merely because Congress recodified a law or even increased the punishment for an offense
without specifying that prosecutions could continue under the former enactment.12 A presumption of prospectivity for ameliorative
measures therefore is unwarranted. Today, the Savings Statute
should be understood as a default in the face of congressional silence. Once it is clear that Congress has considered the temporal
scope of its action, the presumption should disappear.
Alternative justifications, however, might support a strong presumption for prospective application of any legislative change. The
6.
See Kristen Wyatt, Colorado, Washington Pot Legalization: States Await Federal Response to
Marijuana Measure, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2012, 11:09 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/11/10/colorado-washington-pot_n_2109400.html. The state legislatures have
not made such decriminalization retroactive.
7.
Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330–31.
8.
Id. at 2339–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9.
1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
10. Id. (“The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so
expressly provide. . . .”).
11. Dorsey plausibly followed a number of precedents in articulating the presumption of
prospectivity. See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 26–40.
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Article initially considers the well-entrenched norm against retroactive lawmaking. Although courts have been skeptical about
retroactive policymaking,13 the Article rejects the premise that the
conventional reasons against retroactive measures have salience in
the context of legislative amelioration of punishment; retroactivity
in this context does not lead to unfair surprise and does not permit
Congress to “single out” individuals for disadvantageous
treatment.14
The Article then assesses two separation of powers concerns that
might justify a rule against retroactive application of congressional
leniency. First, the Article asks whether Congress’s reduction of
sentences already meted out would interfere with the President’s
pardon authority under Article II of the Constitution. If the pardon
power is exclusive, then Congress cannot reduce the sentences of
those previously convicted because of the Constitution’s separation
of powers scheme. Indeed, a number of state courts have held that
any such legislative efforts to mitigate punishment would be unconstitutional for that reason, and the Office of Legal Counsel in the
Department of Justice has so opined.15 Nonetheless, the Article concludes that the President’s pardon authority is not exclusive and
that, as long as Congress chooses to diminish the sentence for a
particular offense as opposed to an offender, no incursion into the
executive pardon power arises.
Second, even if the Executive’s pardon power is not invaded,
Congress arguably cannot undo a sentence issued by a federal court
that has become final. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,16 the Supreme
Court held that Congress lacks the power to nullify a final judgment.17 As the decision suggests, Congress, as well as state
legislatures, typically has stopped short of extending the benefit of
reduced sentences or decriminalization to those whose convictions
were previously final. The Article argues, however, that Plaut should
not be seen as a bar to a congressional decision to open the jailhouse doors—a decision reducing a sentence, properly
understood, does not undermine the finality of a decision.
At times, retroactive application of ameliorative legislation reflects compelling policy. If Congress decides that a reduced
sentence is sufficient to deter crime henceforth, greater punishment is not needed for those who previously committed the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.
See infra text accompanying notes 72–78.
See infra text accompanying notes 87–92.
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
Id. at 240.
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offense. Edward Dorsey, for example, committed his offense in August 2008. Presumably there are hundreds if not thousands of crack
offenders from that period who agreed to plea bargains before the
Fair Sentencing Act was enacted and therefore are not entitled to
the reduced punishment.18 That those committing the same crime
on the same day face such different punishment merely because of
the timing of their sentences raises a disparity perhaps nearly as
troubling as the racial disparity sparking the social debate over the
gap in sentencing between crack and cocaine offenses.19 Although
the majority addressed the importance of “uniformity and proportionality” in reaching its decision,20 it made only passing mention of
crack offenders in prison whose sentences had become final before
enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.21 The Court’s decision would
have stood on firmer ground had it canvassed the institutional reasons that likely led Congress to withhold the benefit of reduced
punishment from such offenders—in particular Congress’s concern about unraveling the plea bargaining that underlay prior
sentences.
In sum, there are no sound policy reasons or constitutional
grounds to presume that congressional leniency should apply prospectively only. Congress should be accorded the discretion to
determine where to draw the line in determining the proper
amount of retribution for those who committed offenses prior to
the decriminalization or diminution in punishment. As a consequence, the touchstone in each case should be congressional intent
shorn of any interpretive presumption from the 1871 Savings Statute once the court is convinced that there was no legislative
inadvertence.

I. THE SAVINGS STATUTE

AND THE

PRESUMPTION

OF

PROSPECTIVITY

To the Court, resolution of Dorsey turned in part on application
of the Savings Statute.22 If the Savings Statute created a strong presumption against retroactive application of statutory reductions in
punishment, then only changes in the FSA that clearly indicated
18. The median time between indictment and sentencing for such offenses is eleven
months. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2333 (2012).
19. For a discussion of the racial implication of the sentencing disparity, see, e.g.,
LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack
Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375 (2011); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1
Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1223 (1996).
20. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328.
21. Id. at 2335–36.
22. See id. at 2331.
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retroactivity would be applied to offenders who committed antisocial acts prior to the FSA’s enactment.23 The Court stated as much
in Warden v. Marrero,24 explaining that “the savings clause has been
held to bar application of ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at the time of the commission of the
offense.”25
As the history of the Savings Statute demonstrates, however, the
Savings Statute was fashioned to prevent offenders from escaping
punishment because of the common law abatement doctrine, not
to create a strong presumption against retroactivity.26 The Court explained in Marrero that “[c]ommon-law abatements resulted not
only from unequivocal statutory repeals, but also from repeals and
re-enactments with different penalties, whether the re-enacted legislation increased or decreased the penalties.”27 At common law, any
legislative change in a criminal statute was treated as a repeal, and
thus all pending prosecutions under the former statute were discontinued.28 For example, in United States v. Tynen,29 which was
pending when Congress passed the Savings Statute, the Court held
that, when Congress passes a new act that wholly subsumes the
prior parts, the old act is repealed and all criminal proceedings
under it must cease.30 It concluded that “[b]y the repeal the legislative will is expressed that no further proceedings be had under the
act repealed.”31
In other words, when Congress decriminalized offenses, it may
have been logical to presume that no further prosecutions were intended.32 However, the presumption seems less compelling when
Congress increased the penalty for a crime. Yet, the abatement doctrine applied in that context as well, ending pending prosecutions
and enabling offenders to walk free33—a conclusion at odds with
common sense. The abatement doctrine may well have arisen from
23. Cf. id. at 2331–32 (noting that Congress can pass statutes that exempt current legislation from being bound by prior legislation).
24. 417 U.S. 653 (1974).
25. Id. at 661.
26. S. David Mitchell, In with the New, Out With the Old: Expanding the Scope of Retroactive
Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM L. 1, 24–25 (2009).
27. 417 U.S. at 660.
28. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 25.
29. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870).
30. Id. at 93, 95.
31. Id. at 95.
32. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Yeaton v. United States (The General Pinkney), 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 281 (1809), “after the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced,
nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless
some special provision be made for that purpose by statute.” Id. at 283.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 35–38.
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a formalistic view that the prosecution had to stop because the statute on which the prosecution was based was no longer in
existence.34
As an example, consider Lindsey v. State.35 There, the crime in
question punished carrying concealed weapons.36 The Legislature
amended the statute to, among other changes, provide for a minimum twenty-five dollar fine, which was an increase in punishment.37
The Court held that individuals whose punishments had not become finalized at the time of the amendment had to be released
because of the abatement doctrine even though both the prior and
subsequent legislation plainly criminalized the conduct.38 Retroactive application of the enhanced penalties may have violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause, but surely the Legislature intended the former
penalties to remain in force for all offenders whose sentences had
yet to be finalized, even if the enhanced penalties could not be applied. Although the doctrine makes little sense to contemporary
ears and long has been criticized,39 its relevance here is that it
spawned the Savings Statute. Because Congress did not wish to let
offenders fall through the cracks due to its own oversight, it created
the Savings Statute to signify that, as a default, pending prosecutions were to be continued or “saved” despite an alteration to the
operative criminal provision.40
The Savings Statute provides that:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide and
such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the
purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the
enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.41
Most importantly, the Statute reverses the common law abatement
rule and provides that prosecutions under amended statutes can
continue, irrespective of whether the subsequent Congress sought
to increase or decrease the penalty.
34. See, e.g., The Queen v. Denton, (1852) 118 Eng. Rep. 287 (Q.B.) 291 (“[t]he repealed
statute is, with regard to any further operation, as if it had never existed.”).
35. 5 So. 99 (1888).
36. Id. at 99.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 100–01.
39. See, e.g., Albert Levitt, Repeal of Penal Statutes and Effect on Pending Prosecutions, 9 A.B.A.
J. 715 (1923).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 41–45.
41. 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
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Consider United States v. Barr.42 There, authorities arrested Barr
for counterfeiting, and before his trial Oregon altered the law to
require proof of “an intent to defraud.”43 Barr argued that he could
no longer be prosecuted even under the former Act.44 The court
stated that it would have agreed with Barr but for operation of the
Savings Statute:
This . . . is a salutary provision, and if it, or something like it,
had always been incorporated in the statutes of the states and
the United States, it would have prevented many a lame and
impotent conclusion in criminal cases, in which the defendant
escaped punishment because the [L]egislature, in the hurry
and confusion of amending and enacting statutes, had forgotten to insert a clause to save offenses . . . from the effect of
express or implied repeals.
The Statute intended to prevent “lame” legislative mistakes when
Congress altered criminal statutes, such as wording changes and
consolidation among provisions.45 The vice in particular was not
retroactive amelioration but rather the unanticipated abatement of
criminal prosecutions whenever the statutes were modified.
The Savings Statute also provides that penalties imposed on individuals by virtue of the prior statute will not be removed merely by
virtue of the statute’s “repeal,” which courts have construed to apply to any emendation.46 Congress feared the unintended results
that flowed from the abatement doctrine. To use the example from
Lindsey, an individual convicted of carrying a concealed weapon
would not be released merely because the statute had been
amended and the penalties increased in the future.
The Court in Dorsey correctly noted that the Savings Statute also
covers congressional reduction of punishment. However, Congress
intended the Savings Statute to cover both situations—when Congress increased or decreased a penalty—to ensure that prior
offenders were not let out of jail through legislative inadvertence as
discussed in Barr.47 The Savings Statute, therefore, in addition to
overruling the common law abatement doctrine, was a call to future
42. 24 F. Cas. 1016 (D. Ore. 1877) (No. 14,527).
43. Id. at 1016.
44. Id. at 1016–17.
45. See id.
46. See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974) (noting that statutes were even
considered to be repealed because of a change in the associated penalties).
47. Barr, 24 F. Cas. at 1017.
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congresses to take care in specifying the temporal reach of any new
statute.48
The Supreme Court in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill49 cautioned that
the Savings Statute was “meant to obviate mere technical abatement.”50 In Hamm, the Court addressed the retroactive application
of Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196451 to prosecution of sit-in demonstrators. The Act decriminalized the acts for
which the protestors had been arrested and convicted.52 The government relied on the Savings Statute in arguing that the
prosecutions should continue, but the Court disagreed, reasoning
that the Civil Rights Act effected a “drastic” change, which Congress
intended to apply retroactively.53 Hamm suggests that the principle
of prospective application imposes only a burden of production—
as long as the defendant can marshal evidence that Congress intended the reduction in penalty to apply retroactively, the
presumption of prospective application disappears.54 On the other
hand, if the legislation is silent, then the reduction in penalties
should be applied prospectively only.
Indeed, a number of states have construed general savings
clauses to apply only to legislative changes that increase penalties.55
As the Supreme Court of Indiana explained, “enactment of a[n]
ameliorative sentencing amendment was, in itself, a sufficient indication of the legislative intent that it be applied to all to whom such
application would be possible and constitutional, thereby obviating
application of the general saving statute.”56
48. Furthermore, the Court in Dorsey noted the limits that Congress can place on its
successors, another reason to read the Savings Statute to reflect a default provision rather
than a strong presumption. 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2331–32 (2012).
49. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
50. Id. at 314.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006).
52. Hamm, 379 U.S. at 307.
53. Id. at 314.
54. In this respect, the burden is akin to a Thayer evidentiary presumption, which was
dominant at the time that the Savings Statute was enacted. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 2490–91 (3d ed. 1940); see also Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F.3d 263, 273 n.9 (5th Cir.
2007) (“A Thayer-type presumption shifts only the burden of production to the opponent of
the presumption. . . . If the opponent meets this burden, the presumption disappears . . .”
(citation omitted)).
55. See, e.g., In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951–53 (Cal. 1965); People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d
197, 200–01 (N.Y. 1956); People v. Schultz, 460 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Mich. 1990).
56. Lewandowski v. State, 389 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Ind. 1979). The Texas Criminal Code
provides that, when the Legislature alters a penalty, the offender may choose either the prior
or new penalty. Tex. Pen. Code arts. 13, 15.

62

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 47:1

Over time, federal courts have interpreted the Savings Statute to
encompass a normative view about the scope of the retroactive relief that Congress wishes to afford.57 However, it does nothing of
the sort. The Savings Statute should only be triggered when Congress is completely silent as to temporal scope. The historical
anomaly of abatement has misled members of the Court into reading into the Savings Statute a strong congressional presumption
that legislative amelioration not be retroactive. The presumption
makes little sense given the limited purpose of the Savings Statute
at common law. The sparse legislative history rather suggests that
Congress viewed the Savings Statute as a technical amendment designed to help codifiers.58
Thus, the Court in Dorsey should have gone further to reduce
courts’ reliance on the Savings Statute when construing statutes
that reduce punishment. The Court held that any such legislative
change should be applied retroactively only when “ordinary interpretive considerations point clearly in that direction.”59 The
majority explained that “[w]ords such as ‘plain import,’ ‘fair implication,’ or the like reflect the need for that assurance.”60
Furthermore, the four dissenting Justices asserted that the presumption of prospective application should be overcome “only
when the ‘plain import of a later statute directly conflicts’ with it,”61
and concluded that there were insufficient indicia of legislative intent in the FSA to overcome the presumption.62 However, the
Savings Statute was only intended to prevent the courthouse doors
from opening through inadvertence when Congress altered a criminal statute. If there is any evidence that Congress considered the
temporal scope, the presumption of prospectivity should disappear.

II. PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVE LAWMAKING
There may well be plausible reasons to favor prospective application of decriminalization and sentencing reductions outside of the
Savings Statute. The Dorsey Court’s analysis is in line with judicial
57. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312, 316–18 (4th Cir. 1949) (holding that,
without express retroactivity provision, court must apply prior harsher sentencing framework); Hurwitz v. United States, 53 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Maceo v. United States, 46 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1931).
58. See John P. MacKenzie, Comment, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill and the Federal Savings
Statute, 54 Geo. L.J. 173, 181–82 (1965).
59. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2340.
62. Id.
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pronouncements warning against retroactive application of policymaking. As a constitutional matter, the Ex Post Facto Clauses
protect individuals from legislative criminalization of conduct that
was lawful when committed and from enhancement of punishment
for criminal conduct after that conduct was committed.63 The Supreme Court has struck down a number of laws as violating the ex
post facto principle.64
Although retroactive lawmaking is more prevalent in the civil
context,65 even in those instances there are reasons to avoid retroactivity. For example, some retroactive measures violate the Takings
Clause.66 In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the Court noted that legislation may be “unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive
liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated
the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience.”67 Further, the Supreme
Court has articulated a more general presumption against reading
statutes68 and administrative rulemaking69 to apply retroactively. Administrative adjudications have also been overturned for
encroaching on settled expectations, at least in unusual circumstances.70 Thus, “[r]etroactivity is generally disfavored in the law.”71
This Part discusses the general presumption against retroactivity in
lawmaking but rejects its relevance to the amelioration context.
The reasons for suspicions about retroactive policymaking are familiar. Commentators and courts alike long have stressed that
individuals and firms should receive fair notice of penalties prior to
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1.
64. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987) (striking down retroactive application
of Florida’s revised sentencing scheme); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (striking
down application of Florida statute related to good time credits for prisoners).
65. The Court generally has permitted retroactivity in civil cases as long as the underlying congressional decision to reach back in time was reasonable. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976) (“[L]egislative [a]cts adjusting the burdens
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality”
even when upsetting “otherwise settled expectations.”).
66. E.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992); cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (holding that retroactive
enforcement of new statute would violate contract).
67. 524 U.S. at 528–29.
68. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (finding no clear congressional intent to apply a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to pending cases).
69. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988) (noting that an
administrative agency can’t promulgate rules that apply retroactively unless expressly granted
that power by Congress).
70. See Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1081–86 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (en banc) (new principles cannot be applied in administrative adjudication if they
cause unfair surprise).
71. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 532 (citing Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208).
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any antisocial conduct.72 They can then be held accountable for the
consequences of their acts. In addition to these reliance interests,
rule of law concerns oppose retroactivity. Otherwise, legislatures
could single out individuals for criminal or civil sanctions in reaction to contemporary outcry over unpopular actions. A
prospectivity requirement forces legislatures to consider a broad
range of situations before exacting penalties, which minimizes the
possibility that legislators will target a limited group of disfavored
individuals.73 Finally, most legal systems value certainty as a way to
foster stability.74 Otherwise, private ordering cannot proceed as effectively in light of the pall cast by the prospect that the past legal
framework might be disrupted. Although regulatory uncertainty in
the future can also stymie progress, commerce depends on reliance
on the rules and understandings in existence at the time of contracting or investment.
These three related fundamental concerns—honoring reliance
interests, imposing rule of law constraints on legislatures, and valuing certainty—largely are absent when Congress ameliorates the
severity of prior penalties or decriminalizes conduct altogether. No
reliance interest of the offender is threatened since he or she has
no vested interest in a longer sentence. Prosecutors arguably have
considerable interest in seeing that offenders serve out their
sentences, but such reliance is not legally cognizable. Governors
can pardon offenders without trenching on such reliance interests,
as can legislatures through early release programs.75
Society is also far less concerned about rule of law values when
the Legislature lightens penalties. The concern for retroactivity in
that context is not that the Legislature is singling out individuals for
disadvantageous treatment but rather to confer a benefit. Members
of Congress, for instance, might wish to lighten the penalty for
those convicted of unlawful lobbying in order to aid prior supporters. Indeed, Congress might wish to minimize punishment for those
charged with using powder as opposed to crack cocaine given that
members of Congress are more likely to come into contact with

72. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 81, 103–05
(1997); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 426–27
(1982); Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329,
1340–42 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2158–59 (1996).
74. See Laitos, supra note 72, at 103–04.
75. See infra Part III.A.
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users of that form of cocaine.76 Political process constraints, however, make it less likely that problematic instances of legislative
amelioration of punishment will arise. The electorate disapproves
of representatives benefitting acquaintances in such fashion.77 The
risk of arbitrary conduct is higher when the Legislature seeks to
punish prior wrongdoing as opposed to when it benefits those punished in the past.
Moreover, we value certainty in the legal system to support private ordering. Commerce depends on stability in the surrounding
legal framework. Nonetheless, there is no corresponding benefit
from ensuring that sentences are fully served. Executive pardons
and early release statutes are inconsistent with a norm of certainty
in the criminal sentencing context, yet have been upheld as
constitutional.78
Thus, from the reliance, rule of law, and certainty perspectives,
congressional easing of penalties for crack offenders produces no
red flags. There is no breach of settled expectations, no risk that
Congress can single out disfavored individuals for punishment, and
little social concern that retroactive amelioration undermines certainty in the criminal justice system. The traditional skepticism
about retroactivity, therefore, does not support any presumption
that legislative ameliorative efforts be applied prospectively.
Finally, from the perspective of interest group theory,79 there is
little reason to fear inordinate pressure on Congress. Prisoners simply lack political power. Indeed, many of those previously convicted
have already lost the right to vote and are among the least powerful
in society. We are not particularly concerned, therefore, that legislative retroactive amelioration is attributable to lobbying. No one has
accused Congress of capitulating to the crack lobby in passing the

76. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 784 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709
(8th Cir. 1994) (“The prospect of black crack migrating to the white suburbs led the legislators to reflexively punish crack violators more harshly than their white, suburban, powder
cocaine dealing counterparts.”).
77. Of course, Congress can always benefit constituents in the civil context by making
prior investments more valuable. A classic instance is illustrated by congressional approval
for constructing railroads, which typically benefited nearby property owners. Cf. United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) (refusing to permit compensation in condemnation
proceeding for increased valuation due to siting of railroad lines). Such dynamics are not at
stake when criminal penalties are made less harsh.
78.
79.

See infra text accompanying notes 113–17.
For an overview of the interest group account, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
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Fair Sentencing Act. The twenty-five years of deliberations preceding the FSA80 suggest the difficulty in passing amelioration
measures.
Furthermore, the cost of giving prior offenders the benefits of
reduced punishment is that future offenders must benefit as well.
Politicians stand to gain little by appearing soft on criminals. The
Willie Horton saga—triggered when the first President Bush effectively painted his opponent, Governor Michael Dukakis, as soft on
crime for his early release policies—highlights the risk that politicians take by minimizing punishment of offenders.81 There seems
to be little political advantage in extending the benefits of reduced
sentences to those previously convicted. Thus, there is little reason
from an interest group perspective to view congressional decisions
to benefit criminal offenders with skepticism.

III. STRUCTURAL BARS

TO

RETROACTIVE AMELIORATION

Although the reasons for general skepticism of retroactivity do
not apply in the context of reducing criminal sentences, separation
of powers constraints may support Dorsey’s presumption against retroactive application. First, the Legislature’s retroactive amelioration
decision may impinge on the Executive’s pardon power, as some
state courts have held under their respective constitutions.82 If the
pardon power is exclusive, then the Legislature is handcuffed in
attempting to extend the diminution in punishment to those previously convicted. Second, legislative retroactive amelioration may
infringe on the judiciary’s powers by attempting to undo a final judicial decision. Indeed, some have understood the finality principle
in that vein.83 Accordingly, this Section examines the structural bars
to a legislative decision to decriminalize a prior offense or lessen its
punishment.
80. See Sarah Hyser, Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: How Federal Courts Took
the “Fair” Out of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 503, 507–13 (2012).
81. See Anthony Lewis, The Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1988, at A27 (Horton
committed rape while on furlough). Illinois Governor Quinn almost was voted out of office
because of an early release plan gone awry. See Escaping His Past, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 18,
2012, at 1.16. Moreover, state judges have been voted out of office for decisions that appeared pro-defendant to the public. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the
Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular
Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308, 312–24 (1997); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defendant Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 396
n.323 (1995).
82. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part III.B.
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A. Exclusivity of the Pardon Power
If the Executive’s pardon power were exclusive, then congressional efforts to lessen prior punishment would be unavailing. Such
congressional action mimics a pardon by either commuting a sentence to time served or by granting full absolution to the offender.84
Indeed, some academics have argued that the Constitution must be
understood to allocate powers to one branch or another—that concurrent powers should be avoided.85 Although the Supreme Court
has held that Congress cannot interfere with the President’s exercise of the pardon power,86 it has had no occasion to decide
whether congressional decisions to lighten sentences retroactively
violate the pardon power.
Generations ago, several state courts held that legislative efforts
to reduce punishment retroactively violate the separation of powers
doctrine under their state constitutions. For instance, in Ex parte
Chambers,87 the North Dakota Supreme Court invalidated a legislative action designed to set aside prior punishment for violation of
Prohibition laws. The court held that the legislation violated the
governor’s pardon power “in so far as the [new act] attempt[ed] to
extinguish the sentences to imprisonment of persons against whom
judgment of convictions had been had in the trial court prior to the
effective date of such act.”88 Application of Chambers to the FSA
would prevent extending the benefits of reduced punishment to
those previously convicted. Similarly, in People v. LaBuy,89 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a legislative enactment authorizing
trial courts to commute sentences within thirty days of sentencing
violated the governor’s pardon power.90 In the same vein, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a legislative act permitting a
county board of supervisors to discharge infirm convicts violated
the pardon power.91 To those courts, the Executive’s pardon power
84. For an argument that congressional retroactive amelioration likely violates the Pardon Clause, see Note, Today’s Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative
Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 146 (1972).
85. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215,
299–30 (2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)). For a discussion
of the Supreme Court’s overall drift to a view of overlapping powers, see Mark D. Rosen, From
Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2010).
86. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380–81 (1866); United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871) (finding that a law passed by Congress that
limited pardon rights was unconstitutional).
87. 285 N.W. 862 (N.D. 1939).
88. Id. at 865.
89. 120 N.E. 537 (Ill. 1918).
90. Id. at 537–38.
91. State v. Jackson, 109 So. 724, 725–26 (Miss. 1857) (en banc).
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was exclusive, and thus, legislative efforts to mitigate punishment in
any form were invalid. The Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice similarly opined in 1974 that the President’s pardon
power should be deemed exclusive.92
Nonetheless, although the Legislature’s power to diminish the
length of sentences no doubt overlaps with the President’s pardon
power, the exclusivity argument is too broad.93 Both Congress and
courts have long wielded a concurrent power to limit an offender’s
stay in prison.
First, Congress and state legislatures have passed statutes affecting the duration of a prisoner’s stay in prison. Most notably,
congressional passage of the federal parole statute in 191094 was applied to those previously convicted,95 and a federal district court in
Washington held, against the government’s challenge under the
Pardon Clause, that those previously convicted were entitled to its
benefits.96 Perhaps retroactive application there can be rationalized
on the ground that parole generally remains within the authority of
the executive branch.97 Not so, however, with probation. Congress
applied its probation statute in 1925 retroactively.98 The Ninth Circuit in Nix v. James99 held against the government and permitted an
offender, sentenced before the Probation Act was enacted, to receive the benefit of probation.100 The court explained that “[i]t is
generally held that Probation Acts do not encroach on the prerogatives of the Executive under the pardoning power.”101
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Walker102 upheld a statute granting immunity to individuals cooperating with a congressional
92. In responding to a congressional bill to permit draft dodgers immunity, OLC stated
that the provision “constitutes an obvious usurpation of the pardoning power and renders
the bill constitutionally infirm.” Letter from Leon Ulman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable James D. Eastland (Feb. 25, 1974), quoted in Todd
David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of
Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1269 (2003).
93. See Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential Powers: A Reply to
Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383 (2006).
94. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819.
95. Id.; see also Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923).
96. Thompson v. Duehay, 217 F. 484, 486–87 (W.D. Wash, 1914), aff’d, 223 F. 305 (9th
Cir. 1915).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Fryar, 920 F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
executive branch has plenary authority over parole revocation).
98. Federal Probation Act of 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925).
99. 7 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1925).
100. Id. at 592–93.
101. Id. at 594.
102. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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investigation into the newly formed Interstate Commerce Commission.103 As applied to witnesses who had already committed
unlawful acts, the legislation in essence granted a pardon contingent on their cooperation. A witness defended his refusal to testify
in part on the ground that the legislation violated the Pardon
Clause because it removed the penalty for prior acts contingent on
cooperation.104 The Court disagreed, first noting that “[t]he act of
Congress in question securing to witnesses immunity from prosecution is virtually an act of general amnesty, and belongs to a class of
legislation which is not uncommon either in England or in this
country.”105 The Court continued that the President’s pardon
“power has never been held to take from Congress the power to
pass acts of general amnesty.”106
The Supreme Court also has approved congressional acts empowering the Executive to remit civil fines meted by courts. For
instance, in The Laura,107 the Court upheld Congress’s power to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit fines that had been
awarded by a court against steamship owners who had violated federal laws setting occupancy limits for passengers.108 The Court
rejected the argument that the congressional measure was “in conflict with the clause of the Constitution investing the President with
power ‘to grant reprieves and pardons for all offences against the
United States. . . .’ ”109 To the Court, the presidential pardon power
was not exclusive.110 As the Court stressed earlier in Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,111 “Congress had clearly the power to
authorize the [S]ecretary of the Treasury to remit any penalty or
forfeiture incurred . . . either before or after judgment.”112 Indeed,
Congress first passed a measure authorizing remission of fines in
1790.113
103. Id. at 609–10.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 601 (citation omitted).
106. Id. In dissent, Justice Field asserted that “[t]he legal exemption of an individual from
the punishment which the law prescribes for the crime he has committed is a pardon, by
whatever name the act may be termed. And a pardon is an act of grace which is, so far as
related to offenders against the United States, the sole prerogative of the President to grant.”
Id. at 638 (Field, J., dissenting).
107. 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
108. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, § 5294, 1 Rev. Stat. 1028; The Laura, 114 U.S. at 414–16.
109. The Laura, 114 U.S. at 413.
110. Id. at 414–16.
111. 44 U.S. 534 (1845).
112. Id. at 552.
113. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 122; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1
Stat. 199, 209 (authorizing remission of statutory penalties for failure to pay liquor tax).
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More recently, a number of state legislatures have passed early
release statutes in the face of prison overcrowding. Those statutes
have withstood attacks based on gubernatorial pardon powers. For
instance, the Michigan Legislature responded to a financial crisis by
passing the Prison Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act.114 In Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney v. Michigan Department of
Corrections,115 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court and upheld the statute against a challenge that the Legislature had undermined the Executive’s pardon power.116 The Court
noted that:
[a]lthough the retroactive reduction of minimum sentences
because of prison overcrowding has consequences similar to
commutation, it derives from a wholly separate constitutional
grant of power. . . . Further, the Legislature has done nothing
to directly interfere with the Governor’s function; he remains
free to pardon or commute the sentences of individual prisoners as he, in his discretion, feels the circumstances warrant.117
Second, understanding the President’s pardon authority as exclusive would undermine our tradition recognizing that Congress
can change a criminal provision or penalty and thereby halt a pending prosecution. No one disputes that Congress can diminish
penalties for those offenders whose cases are pending, as in Dorsey.
Yet, the presidential pardon power also plainly covers individuals
who have not yet been convicted118—President Carter issued an

114. 1980 Mich. Pubs. Act 519 (repealed 1987).
115. 305 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. 1981).
116. Id. at 519–21.
117. Id. at 520–21. See also People v. Matelic, 641 N.W.2d 252, 264–66 (Mich. 2001) (upholding statute providing for early release of prisoners who cooperated with law
enforcement). In Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court considered
Florida’s early release statute that authorized early release credits to prisoners when the population of the state prison system exceeded prescribed levels. Id. at 435. The Act was couched
in mandatory terms—the Legislature decreased punishment for the administrative purpose
of alleviating the burden on the overly strapped prison system. Id. at 437–38. The case only
rose to the Supreme Court in light of Florida’s decision to cancel certain early release provisions, which the Court concluded violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 446–47. The
Florida courts themselves had never held that the early release statutes violated the Executive’s pardon authority. As with federal statutes, state legislatures have dictated early release,
and such efforts have not been thought to violate the Executive’s pardon authority.
118. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“The Executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by
individuals, or by classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress.”).
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amnesty to draft evaders,119 President Ford pardoned President
Nixon,120 the first President Bush pardoned George Steinbrenner
before trial,121 and President Clinton pardoned George Prosperi in
advance of conviction.122
In the United States, legislatures enjoy the power to direct that
pending prosecutions be dropped or decided under new rules.123
In United States v. Tynen,124 as discussed above, the Court held that
even modification of criminal statutes required abating all prosecutions under the old statute: “[b]y the repeal of the 13th section of
the act of 1813 all criminal proceedings taken under it fell.”125 The
very need for a federal savings statute in that same era derived from
the common law rule that repeal of a criminal statute required
abatement of all criminal proceedings under the old statute.126
Tynen strongly supports the conclusion that the President’s pardon power is not exclusive. Otherwise, Congress could not direct
that pending prosecutions be halted even when decriminalizing a
statute. If congressional action paralleling pardons of individuals
before conviction does not violate the President’s pardon authority,
it is difficult to understand why congressional action after sentencing would be unconstitutional.
Third, courts themselves arguably have disrupted the Executive’s
pardon authority when finding that the offender either was convicted under a statute subsequently found unconstitutional or
convicted under rules of criminal procedure that undermined the
integrity of the judgment. The Supreme Court in Ex parte Siebold127
directed that a conviction pursuant to an unconstitutional statute
should be considered null: “A conviction under [such a law] is not
merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal
119. Proclamation No. 4483, 3 C.F.R. 4 (1977); see generally PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY
BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1975).
120. See Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372, 1374–75 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (declining to
review Ford’s pardon of Nixon).
121. See Julie Johnson, Steinbrenner Pardoned by Reagan for ’72 Election Law Violation, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1989.
122. See Leon Fooksman, Embezzler Gets House Arrest, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, March
3, 2001, at 1B.
123. The same evidently is true in England. See Comment, Today’s Law and Yesterday’s
Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 120, 125–26
(1972) (discussing how the abatement doctrine is similarly applied in England).
124. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870).
125. Id. at 95; see supra note 55.
126. See 1 U.S.C. 109 (2006) (“The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty . . . unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide . . . ”).
127. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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cause of imprisonment.”128 Similarly, after holding in Ford v. Wainwright129 that the Eighth Amendment barred execution of prisoners
who are insane,130 it would have been extraordinary to permit such
executions for those who had been previously sentenced. Also,
upon holding that laws criminalizing interracial marriage were unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia,131 the Supreme Court would not
have tolerated continued incarceration for those in prison for that
very offense. Such exercise of judicial discretion has never been
thought to violate the President’s pardon power. As Justice Brennan commented in concurrence in United States v. United States Coin
& Currency,132 “a decision holding certain conduct beyond the
power of government to sanction or prohibit must be applied to
prevent the continuing imposition of sanctions for conduct engaged in before the date of that decision.”133
In summary, the President’s pardon power is not exclusive, leaving room for Congress to grant amnesties and pass early release
statutes. Congress, in other words, can limit punishment for offenses retroactively without violating the pardon power.
Congress, however, may lack the power to ameliorate the sentence of a particular offender, as opposed to a class of offenders.
Congressional power to reduce punishment likely is linked to its
authority to create penalties in the first instance. While Congress
unquestionably enjoys the power to enact private bills to benefit
individuals who were injured or who otherwise are deportable,134
Congress’s authority to show mercy on particular criminal offenders is less clear. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed
Congress’s power to lessen punishment for particular offenders, it
has discussed the converse situation of congressional decisions to
single out individuals for adverse treatment. In invalidating on Bill
of Attainder grounds a provision of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,135 which precluded Communists from
holding most jobs within labor unions,136 the Court in United States
v. Brown137 reasoned that courts, as opposed to legislatures, are to
128. Id. at 376–77; see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–65 (2011) (reaffirming that offender has standing to challenge constitutionality of criminal law on any
ground).
129. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
130. Id. at 409–10.
131. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
132. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
133. Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. See generally Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966).
135. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
136. § 504, 73 Stat. at 536–37.
137. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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make case-by-case determinations of blameworthiness.138 Congress’s
power to criminalize conduct and set appropriate penalties may encompass changing penalties for particular crimes retroactively but
may not allow for adjustment of particular prisoners’ sentences.139
The Framers warned of congressional meddling in specific judicial
cases.140
Yet, to the extent that the President’s pardon power is exclusive
upon a request from a particular individual, the fact remains that
congressional discretion to lessen the sentences of all those convicted of a particular offense is constitutionally unproblematic. A
congressional decision to make the FSA fully retroactive, therefore,
would not have violated the President’s pardon power.

B. Interference with Final Decisions
Even if legislative efforts to mitigate punishment comport with
the President’s pardon power, they may nonetheless run afoul of
the judiciary’s power by undoing a final judgment. Indeed, perhaps
the concern underlying the state court decisions that have blocked
such legislative efforts141 rests on the danger of permitting legislatures to invade the province of the Judiciary rather than the
Executive.
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,142 the question raised was whether
Congress could retroactively extend the statute of limitations for a
securities action that had been dismissed as time barred.143 The Supreme Court held that Congress lacks the power to nullify a final
judgment: “We know of no previous instance in which Congress has
enacted retroactive legislation requiring an Article III court to set
aside a final judgment, and for good reason. The Constitution’s
separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority
to do so.”144 The Court reasoned that “[h]aving achieved finality,
however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial
138. See id. at 445.
139. The California court in In re Kemp, 192 Cal. App. 4th 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011),
reached the same conclusion under the California Constitution using slightly different reasoning. The key to the court was whether the ameliorative legislation sought to “commute
existing sentences as an act of grace” or rather “to bring them in line with sentences under
the new law, in furtherance of the . . . principal objective of making punishments uniform.”
Id. at 263.
140. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395–97 (1798) (opinion of Paterson, J.).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
142. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
143. Id. at 213–15.
144. Id. at 240.
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department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and
Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to the very case was something other than what the courts
said it was.”145 Justice Scalia for the Court stressed that the constitutional ill could not be remedied even if Congress changed the law
for a class of cases as opposed to an individual case.146 When responding to Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion focusing on the
protections of general lawmaking, Justice Scalia asserted, “[t]he
nub of that infringement consists not of the Legislature’s acting in a
particularized and hence (according to the concurrence) nonlegislative fashion; but rather of the Legislature’s nullifying prior,
authoritative judicial action.”147
Plaut may explain why Congress typically has not chosen to benefit those offenders who have already been sentenced, even when
decriminalizing an action.148 Congress’s reticence, however, should
not be taken for a constitutional rule. Properly understood, a congressional decision to open the jailhouse doors does not disturb the
finality of a judgment but rather modifies the prior ruling’s continuing impact. Congress’s decision to make the 1925 Probation Act
fully retroactive provides a leading example.149
As noted previously, Congress long has authorized the executive
branch to remit fines for particular offenses even after a final decision. Congress extended that authorization to “fines, penalties, and
forfeitures” and did not limit relief to before final judgment.150 As
The Laura evidences, the Executive has lowered penalties through
means other than the pardon power at the direction of Congress.
Legislation modifying relief therefore also does not undermine the
sanctity of a final judgment.
Moreover, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,151
the Supreme Court considered whether Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by interfering with a final judgment
previously entered in a commerce case. The Court previously held
that a bridge over the Ohio River obstructed navigation of the river
145. Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
146. Id. (“To be sure, a general statute such as this one may reduce the perception that
legislative interference with judicial judgments was prompted by individual favoritism; but it
is legislative interference with judicial judgments nonetheless.”).
147. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
148. See also Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782–84 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the
legislative effort to diminish sentences retroactively unconstitutionally infringed on judicial
power by disturbing a final decision).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
150. In The Laura, the remission occurred prior to final judgment. See supra text accompanying notes 109–11.
151. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856).
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and had ordered that the bridge be removed.152 Congress responded by enacting legislation declaring the bridge to be a lawful
structure and enlisting the bridge “for the passage of the mails of
the United States.”153 The Court upheld the legislation, reasoning
in pertinent part that Congress enjoys the power to alter the prospective effect of a judicial decision.154
To be sure, decisions in The Laura and Wheeling preceded Plaut
by generations. After Plaut, the Supreme Court in Miller v. French155
stressed the continuing vitality of Wheeling. Miller addressed a provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),156
specifying that a motion to terminate prospective relief in a prison
conditions case “shall operate as a stay” of that relief until the court
resolves the motion.157 The PLRA thus eliminated the court’s discretion to continue a prior injunction, at least for a certain time
period. The Court explained that “[a]lthough the remedial injunction here is a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of appeal,”158 the
automatic stay did not intrude into the province of the courts:
“Congress’ imposition of a time limit . . . does not in itself offend
the structural concerns underlying the Constitution’s separation of
powers.”159
Similarly, in Cobell v. Norton160 the D.C. Circuit considered the
government’s appeal from an injunction requiring it to formulate a
plan to remedy problems plaguing management of Individual Indian Management accounts, including a requirement to undertake
an accounting of past payments. Congress, several months after the
district court injunction, passed a law providing the government
temporary immunity from conducting a historical accounting.161
The appellate court distinguished Plaut on the ground that, as in
Wheeling, continuing relief is subject to legislative oversight.162
Altering the duration of the time that an offender stays in prison
presents a close analogy to the legislative adjustments upheld in
152. Id. at 429.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 436.
155. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
156. Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321–66.
157. § 3626(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 1321–68 to 1321–69; 530 U.S. at 333–34.
158. 530 U.S. at 347 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995)).
159. Id. at 349. To be sure, early release statutes, unlike the stay in Miller, permanently
alter the litigants’ rights. Nonetheless, in both contexts, Congress has limited the prospective
operation of a final judicial decision.
160. 392 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
161. Pub. L. No. 108-108, 117 Stat. 1241, 1263 (2003); Cobell, 392 F.3d at 465–66.
162. See 392 F.3d at 467. See also Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1667–68
(10th Cir. 2004) (following Wheeling by permitting congressional measure to supersede settlement agreement addressing logging rights).
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Miller and Cobell. Conditions have changed, as in the PLRA example, warranting early release. Legislative reduction of punishment
does not undermine the finality of the trial court’s sentencing decision any more than altering the stay of a trial court’s injunction.163
Even when Congress diminishes punishment, the fact of conviction
remains on the books, as do collateral consequences such as deprivation of the right to vote or inability to hold particular government
offices.164 All that has changed is the time the individual is required
to stay behind bars.
Viewed another way, Congress always can interfere with the impact of a final decision. If a court holds that sovereign immunity
bars a suit or that an individual is deportable, Congress cannot
change the decision, but it can pass a private bill awarding money
or blocking the deportation. Moreover, it has done so on numerous
occasions.165 Through the private bill mechanism, therefore, Congress can adjust the continuing relevance of a court decision, as it
did by passing new legislation in Wheeling.166
A congressional directive to release prisoners before expiration
of their sentences is no different. Congress has altered the consequences of the judicial decision, but not the decision itself.
Operation of the parole system works in similar vein. A court’s judgment as to conviction is final, the court sets the framework for
punishment, but the actual time behind bars is determined by parole authorities subject to legislative determinants.167
This is not to suggest that Congress can order particular offenders released as opposed to a class of offenders.168 Justice Breyer
clearly signaled in Plaut his view of the risks of Congress singling
out particular individuals for favored treatment.169 Private bills have
163. State courts have rejected challenges to early release programs based on alleged
violation of judicial finality. See, e.g., Fields v. Driesel, 941 P.2d 1000, 1002–05 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1997) (reversing sentencing court that had issued an order requiring the director of the
prison system to comply with prior sentence meted out or show cause why he should not be
in contempt for infringing finality of court order); State v. Stenklyft, 697 N.W.2d 769, 786
(Wis. 2005) (recognizing legislative role in fashioning early release provision: “The ability to
obtain early release under the system of parole existed solely as a matter of legislative
grace. . . . ”).
164. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65
(2003); Andrea Steinacker, The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the
Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801 (2003).
165. See supra note 136.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54.
167. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
168. Although the Legislature’s power to affect punishment is longstanding, there is
some historical support for legislative issuance of pardons in individual cases. See, e.g., Perkins
v. United States, 99 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1938); United States v. Hall, 53 F. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1892).
169. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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not historically been used in the criminal context—nor should they
be. Congressional power to disrupt final decisions stems from the
power to change punishment for the entire class of crimes.170
In sum, the presidential pardon power and Plaut do not present
persuasive reasons to favor prospective application of congressional
statutes. The issue is one of legislative policy, namely whether the
interest in treating similarly situated offenders similarly outweighs
the interest in finality. There were no constitutional obstacles
preventing Congress from benefiting those previously convicted of
trafficking crack.

IV. ADDITIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL
AMELIORATION OF PUNISHMENT
Given the absence of structural impediments to retroactive application of a legislative decision to ameliorate punishment, it is up to
Congress to determine the temporal scope of any such efforts. Congress in the FSA could have decided to benefit those previously
sentenced for crack infractions if it chose, much as Congress in
1925 retroactively applied the new Probation Act.171 To the extent
that the one hundred-to-one ratio in punishment between crack
and powdered cocaine offenses was untenable, notions of fairness
strongly counsel for retroactive application. Why retain disproportionate punishment when Congress determined that it had
previously erred in prescribing such draconian punishment? Indeed, it would be hard to explain to a client sentenced to twenty
years for dealing in crack why someone convicted of the very same
crime can be released over fifteen years earlier merely because the
second person’s sentencing became final after Congress mitigated
punishment in 2010. For crack offenses, Congress could have, and
perhaps should have, applied the FSA retroactively.
Recently, Professor S. David Mitchell has argued that Congress
has no rational reason to distinguish between those whose
sentences were finalized on the day that the congressional amelioration decision went into effect from those whose sentences were

170. In other words, Congress can alter punishment for a class of offenders without violating either Plaut or the pardon power. In the criminal context, at least, Justice Breyer’s
analysis in Plaut is critical. Congress’s power to affect a final judicial decision turns on its
Article I power to set penalties for a crime.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
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not finalized.172 Accordingly, Mitchell asserts that neither consequentialist nor retributivist theories of punishment support
continuing punishment for those whose actions subsequently are
decriminalized or punished less severely.173
Consider California’s recent decision in In re Kemp.174 There, the
appellate court considered the habeas challenge of a nonviolent offender who claimed that he was entitled to the retroactive benefit
of administrative credits provided by the California Legislature after
he was sentenced.175 He argued not that the Legislature intended to
benefit offenders whose judgments had become final, but that the
Equal Protection Clause required that the benefits be extended to
him.176
In finding no rational basis to support the Legislature’s decision
to decline retroactive application of the new measure, the court
started from the premise that the Legislature’s only goal was to save
the expense of incarceration for similarly situated offenders:
Since the purpose of [the legislation] is solely economic, the
only reasonably conceivable justification for treating the two
subgroups differently for equal protection analysis would be if
one group were more dangerous than the other. . . . However,
since the entire group of eligible prisoners consists of those
prisoners deemed safe for early release based upon the offense
or offenses they have committed, neither subgroup is more
dangerous than the other.177
The court concluded that, as a matter of equal protection, the legislation could not satisfy the rational basis test.178
The Kemp court went on to consider whether the Legislature’s
independent concern in preserving finality could, by itself, satisfy
the rational basis test. In tension with the suppositions of Dorsey, the
court asserted that “[c]ertainly, the date of finality of judgment
bears no rational basis for making such a distinction.”179 The separation of powers concern could not meet the equal protection
172. See Mitchell, supra note 26, 14–17. For a similar view expressed by a jurisprudential
legend, see Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 50 Hastings L.J. 771, 790 n.54 (1999).
173. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 14–17.
174. 192 Cal. App. 4th 252 (Cal Ct. App. 2011).
175. S.B. 18, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009–2010, ch. 28, § 50 (Cal. 2009).
176. Kemp, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 257.
177. Id. at 261.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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burden of justifying a distinction between the two groups of offenders based on their conduct or status.180 Therefore, the
administrative credit benefit had to be applied retroactively.
From a deterrence perspective, In re Kemp is on solid ground.
Little can be gained by maintaining the prior punishment scheme
after the Legislature decriminalizes an offense or changes a legislative classification. The deterrence objective will not be thwarted if
offenders know that they will benefit should the Legislature later
decriminalize the offensive conduct or lessen the punishment. The
prospect is far too remote. Furthermore, from the perspective of
specific deterrence, there is no need to continue punishment if the
offense is decriminalized or the punishment exceeds the cap now
placed by the Legislature. As in the crack example, Congress has set
the term of imprisonment that is appropriate to deter all future
offenders. Relatedly, there is little need for extended rehabilitation
when the Legislature has stated that, henceforth, the underlying
conduct should not be punished as severely or at all.181 For example, if state legislatures now believe that marijuana possession
should not be punished, there is no need to rehabilitate those who
previously had been convicted of possession.
Thus, from a deterrence vantage point, a congressional decision
to keep an offender in jail past a term of imprisonment that subsequent offenders must serve is, as In re Kemp held, invalid under the
rational basis test. Congress must have at least some plausible objective in holding offenders committing the same offense to different
jail terms. A legislative decision that every offender whose last name
started with an A, E, I, O or U must continue to serve time would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
From a retributivist perspective,182 however, Professor Mitchell’s
argument falters in at least three contexts. Moreover, institutional
concerns present a fourth setting that, at times, can legitimate decisions to extend benefits prospectively only.
1. As an initial matter, consider what some have termed “legalistic” retribution, which is retribution arising because an offender
knowingly transgresses a rule of the community.183 The fact that
180. Id. at 262–63. Kemp is not an aberration. In In re Kapperman, 522 P.2d 657 (Cal.
1974), a prisoner contended that he should benefit from a prospective change in computation of certain good time credits. The court agreed that there was no rational basis to deny
him and those similarly situated the benefit of the computational change. Id. at 662.
181. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 14–16.
182. Professor Mitchell argues that “an ameliorative change represents a legislative acknowledgement, and by proxy a societal acknowledgement as well, that the prior penalty was
disproportionate to the conduct.” Id. at 16.
183. Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 843, 885–86 (2002).
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norms later change in no way undermines the conclusion that the
individual knowingly (depending on the mens rea required) violated a rule of the community. At least in the context of
decriminalization, Congress rationally could treat those who knowingly violated a social command differently from those who did not,
even though the conduct was the same.
Take a simple example. Suppose that a person has been convicted of reckless driving after being clocked at seventy miles per
hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone on a highway. The jurisdiction later changes the law to permit seventy miles per hour on that
stretch of highway. Should the offender’s punishment be lessened?
Even though the community no longer views the prior speed as
wrongful, that person chose to travel that speed knowing that the
community at the earlier time regarded fifty-five miles per hour as
the appropriate speed. Why should not the person suffer just desserts for willfully or recklessly violating the social order? Indeed, the
person’s behavior may have been designed to gain some kind of
advantage over fellow citizens, such as arriving at a destination prior
to others.184 At times, laws prevent one individual from gaining an
unfair advantage over others.185
Granted, it would be difficult to assess how much punishment is
appropriate for intentional violations of such laws, but surely some
punishment is warranted for knowingly violating a social command.
In essence, part of each sentence is attributable to the blameworthiness of the underlying act and part due to the willingness to violate
a social command. Congress, therefore, even in the case of
decriminalization, rationally may decide to let some punishment be
served by prior offenders.
The legalistic retribution argument, however, does not fully justify congressional refusal to extend the benefit to all offenders
when diminishing punishment. It is difficult to know how much of
the original prison term for offenders sentenced prior to the legislative change is attributable to the willing violation of the social
order. From a retributivist perspective, therefore, the offenders who
were sentenced before that change already may have been punished sufficiently, even if their original sentences are cut short.
184. Alternatively, the violation of the law might have prompted others to reconsider
their own law-abiding ways, even if the offender did not cause danger on the highways.
185. Consider repeal of an anti-gouging statute. Even if a legislature decides to
decriminalize raising prices of commodities during an emergency, those who previously were
convicted of the offense attempted, by raising prices, to benefit at the expense of competitors
as well as consumers. A similar dynamic would arise from decriminalization of particular
antitrust laws. See also HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33–34 (1976).
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2. Even in the case of diminution of punishment, there may be
additional reasons from a retributive perspective to differentiate
punishment for those who commit crimes before and after legislative amelioration. Professor Mitchell views retribution from a static
perspective: any contemporary decision to reduce punishment is
tantamount to a determination that the original punishment was
mistaken.186 Yet, the same antisocial conduct may “merit” different
punishment—whether more187 or less—in the Legislature’s eyes because of changed factual circumstances as opposed to morality. The
appropriateness of particular punishment or, indeed, whether to
punish at all, ebbs and flows with societal changes that may not be
directly linked to the underlying conduct at stake.188
For instance, it may be one thing to conspire to ship unlicensed
liquor over state lines now and quite another thing to have committed the same conduct during Prohibition. Congress may have
lowered the punishment for interstate shipment of unlicensed liquor after Prohibition, but that does not suggest that a predecessor
Congress somehow erred in ascribing a more serious penalty during Prohibition.189 Similarly, consider someone convicted of
importing marijuana into the United States before the recent
decriminalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado. As in
the Prohibition context, the social opprobrium we place on such
conduct may be less now than before, but that does not mean that
we should ease the punishment for conduct when there was no legal use for marijuana at the time of the offense. In the speeding
example itself, the Legislature likely raised the speed limit because
of safer roads and cars, which would not excuse speeding in an era
in which such speeds were riskier. Blanket retroactive amelioration
ignores that diminished legislative punishment or decriminalization may take into account factual or legal circumstances that were
not in effect at the time the crime was committed.190
186. See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 16–17; see also supra note 174.
187. Of course, legislative decisions to impose greater punishment retroactively are
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
188. I am not arguing that we should block retroactive amelioration to defer to the morality of prior legislatures but rather that some crimes are now considered socially less
blameworthy because of changed factual circumstances and not merely because of changed
morality per se.
189. Cf. Hurwitz v. United States, 53 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (maintaining punishment
for illegal transport of liquor after Prohibition); Maceo v. United States, 46 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1931) (same).
190. The dynamic can be reversed. Changes in larger society often make conduct worse
in retrospect than at the time the conduct took place. Theft of large amounts of fertilizer
became more threatening only when the potential for its use in homemade explosives became understood, and the same is true for the unlicensed importation of pseudoephedrine
(e.g., Sudafed), which over time has become a critical ingredient of crystal meth.
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Admittedly, no changed circumstances likely precipitated the
FSA. Presumably, a more realistic understanding of crack’s addictive qualities prompted the congressional decision to reduce
penalties, not a change in the surrounding factual or legal circumstances.191 Decriminalization for possession of liquor after
Prohibition, possession of marijuana in select states, and lessened
penalties for trafficking crack all stem from evolving views of blameworthiness, which offer no justification for punishing prior
offenders more harshly.
3. Nonetheless, even when there are no changed circumstances, Congress, consistent with retributive goals, may decline to
benefit those whose sentences had been finalized. Congress might
respect the finality line in such contexts due to the plea bargaining
that underlies most sentencing today. A sentence of ten years for
trafficking crack may reflect the prosecution’s assessment of blameworthiness based on a welter of offenses, including trafficking in
other banned substances, possession, assault, and so forth.
Retroactive diminution of punishment may unravel the bargain.
The prosecution may have dropped other charges in contemplation of the significant sentence doled out for the crack offense. Had
the potential penalties for the crack offense been less, the plea bargaining may have resulted in the same sentence due to the
presence of other charges. Offenders could retort that they would
have bargained for a lesser sentence had they known of the diminished potential penalty for trafficking crack. Even if the plea
bargaining would have resulted in a lower sentence, however, the
level of reduction would be impossible to predict after the fact. In
light of the prevalence of plea bargaining, Congress might decide
that it is too difficult to rescramble the egg and thus leave finalized
sentences untouched.192 A congressional reluctance to disturb prior
sentences, therefore, may be rooted in retribution and satisfy the
equal protection principle.193 That is arguably why Congress’s general decision to apply sentencing changes based on when the

191. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328–29 (2012) (describing context for
Congress’s decision to lower the penalties); Hyser, supra note 80, 509–13; Tyler B. Parks,
Note, The Unfairness of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1107–08, 1114,
1116–17 (2012).
192. Cf. United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that if Congress
intended retroactive application, “it may well be arguable that—where the earlier and higher
penalty was part of the bargain—the government may . . . be entitled to withdraw from the
plea agreement if the bargain is now frustrated by the change in penalties”).
193. In contrast, the court in In re Kemp was not presented with a situation in which plea
bargaining was pivotal since only gain time provisions were at stake.

FALL 2013]

Retroactivity and Crack Sentencing Reform

83

sentencing occurs as opposed to when the unlawful act occurs is
plausible.194
4. Finally, legislatures may reduce the penalties for particular
crimes, not because of changed circumstances or views of the
wrongfulness of the underlying conduct, but for instrumental reasons due to the rising cost of incarceration or the social costs of
incarcerating too many young men. Such decisions to ameliorate
punishment do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that those
previously convicted also should have their punishments reduced.
A rational legislature could conclude that the social or other benefits of the lightened punishment are more important with respect
to those sentenced in the future than those sentenced in the past.
For instance, if the goal is minimizing incarceration of young offenders, then there is more reason to limit future incarceration
than to open the jailhouse doors for those sentenced under the
prior regime. Or, it may be that those previously convicted and
spending time in jail may benefit less from innovative alternative
punishment schemes. In the FSA context, one judge noted the potential social impact from releasing so many convicted felons at
once: “Understandably, Congress might not have wanted a large
volume of previously sentenced offenders to be released from
prison immediately.”195 Such instrumental objectives should satisfy
the Equal Protection Clause, even though they are not linked to the
conduct criminalized.
Thus, Congress at times may intend that the mitigated punishment or decriminalization be applied prospectively only. Congress
can vary punishment based on the timing of an offense because
offenders are not similarly situated when the offenses occur before
a new statute goes into effect. In short, Congress readily may satisfy
equal protection concerns in withholding full retroactive effect
from an amelioration decision. Although Congress did not articulate its justification for choosing the finality line in the FSA, a
reluctance to unravel plea agreements—among other rationales—
plainly would satisfy a rational basis test.

194. As the Ninth Circuit held in Jones v. Cupp, 452 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir, 1971), “[t]here is
nothing unconstitutional in a legislature’s conferring a benefit on prisoners only prospectively.” Id. at 1093 (quoting Comerford v. Commonwealth, 233 F.2d 294, 295 (1st Cir. 1956)).
In re Kemp reminds us, however, that some rational reason must be inferred. See supra notes
177–80 and accompanying text.
195. United States v. Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 229 (D. Me. 2010), aff’d, 644 F.3d 39
(1st Cir. 2011).
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Constitutional concerns should not shape statutory interpretation of congressional line drawing when ameliorating punishment.
Neither the pardon power nor Plaut precludes retroactive application of such decisions, just as the Equal Protection Clause does not
compel it. Given the wide array of objectives that may lead Congress
to decriminalize conduct or mitigate punishment, conventional
statutory interpretation tools should be deployed once there is
some evidence of congressional consideration of temporal scope.
Application of statutory interpretation rules to Dorsey should have
been straightforward. Congress plainly considered the retroactivity
issue in the FSA. In Section 8 of the FSA, Congress directed the
Sentencing Commission to conform the Guidelines to the statutory
changes “as soon as practicable”196 and to fashion emergency guidelines to that end.197 Congress directed that the Commission amend
the Guidelines within ninety days of the enactment198 and report on
administration of the FSA within five years.199 The entire thrust of
the new statute was to end the “disproportionally harsh sanctions”
for crack cocaine that had prevailed for twenty years.200 The Court
stressed that it would be contrary to congressional will to perpetuate the stricter sentencing scheme more than necessary.201 Indeed,
Congress at one point had rejected an amendment that would have
confined the change to conduct occurring after passage of the
FSA.202
Moreover, the FSA largely should be viewed in the context of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,203 which the FSA amended. Under
that framework, courts are to consult the Sentencing Guidelines “in
effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,”204 barring any ex
post facto issues. The question of when the conduct occurs is not
relevant.205 As the Court stated, “consistency with ‘other guideline
196. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374.
197. Id.; see also Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2012).
198. § 8, 124 Stat. at 2374.
199. § 10, 124 Stat. at 2375. The report could not be comprehensive if the FSA were to
apply prospectively only. See Hyser, supra note 80, at 526.
200. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007).
201. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2333 (noting that the dissent’s reasoning “would involve imposing upon the pre-Act offender a pre-Act sentence at a time after Congress had specifically
found in the Fair Sentencing Act that such a sentence was unfairly long.”).
202. H.R. 265, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009) (“There shall be no retroactive application of any
portion of this Act.”).
203. Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1987.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
205. See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2331.
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provisions’ and with prior Commission practice would require application of the new Guidelines amendments to offenders who
committed their offense prior to the new amendments’ effective
date but were sentenced thereafter.”206 Congress explicitly created a
default mechanism in the Sentencing Guidelines such that all
changes in sentencing matters should be applied to offenders who
had not been sentenced, but not to those whose sentences had
been finalized.
The divided Court in Dorsey therefore reached the right result
but had no need to rely on the Savings Statute presumption articulated in Marrero. Once the Court concluded that this was not a case
of legislative inadvertence, the presumption should have
disappeared.
Strangely, while addressing at length whether to draw a line between those whose punishment had not yet been finalized and
those who had yet to commit the offense, the Court in Dorsey all but
ignored the plight of those sentenced before the FSA who were suffering under what Congress itself had labeled unjustifiable
punishment. The majority noted the anomaly but merely remarked
that such disparities would exist “unless Congress intends re-opening sentencing proceedings concluded prior to a new law’s effective
date.”207 The Court continued, “[w]e have explained how in federal
sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from
defendants already sentenced.”208 Yet, rarely has Congress concluded that a range of prior sentences was so patently unjust, and
one would think more empathy toward those already sentenced
would have been appropriate. Congress could and perhaps should
have lightened the sentences of those previously convicted, but it
stopped short, presumably for some mixture of retributive and instrumental reasons. Congress’s refusal to benefit those previously
sentenced for crack possession, even those who committed the unlawful conduct on the same day as Mr. Dorsey, should not suggest a
want of congressional power. Future Congresses should heed the
lesson of the Federal Probation Act209 and apply ameliorated punishment retroactively where appropriate.

206.
207.
208.
209.

132 S. Ct. at 2333.
Id. at 2335.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Dorsey reasonably concluded that Congress wished to apply the reduced penalties for crack offenses to
those who had yet to be sentenced. Congress’s directive in the FSA
that all changes be implemented as soon as possible, as well as the
general framework of the Sentencing Guidelines, strongly supports
that result. Thus, the Court permitted limited retroactivity of Congress’s decision to reduce punishment for crack offenders.
Nevertheless, the Court missed a critical opportunity to clarify that
Congress, if it so chooses, can reach back to benefit those previously
convicted of the decriminalized or lightened offense. The traditional concerns militating against retroactive application of new
rules are simply absent when Congress decriminalizes an offense or
reduces the penalty. Moreover, neither the President’s pardon
power nor the separation of powers concern in Plaut prevents Congress from reducing the penalty for those previously sentenced.
The Court’s omission likely stemmed from its overreliance on
the Savings Statute. Congress passed that statute merely to limit operation of the common law abatement doctrine and thereby
prevent dropping prosecutions whenever Congress altered a penalty scheme, whether increasing or reducing punishment. The
Savings Statute is about “saving” prosecutions, not about the retroactive scope of any statute reducing punishment or decriminalizing
a statute. Although the Court reached the appropriate result in Dorsey, it should have dismantled the presumption that all ameliorative
changes be applied only prospectively in the absence of compelling
evidence of contrary congressional intent.
In light of diminished deterrence concerns, Congress might decide in appropriate contexts that all offenders should benefit from
reduced punishment, irrespective of whether their sentences have
been finalized. Future legislatures may resolve to visit the benefits
of decriminalizing possession of marijuana on prior offenders. In
the alternative, Congress may determine in instances, such as with
the FSA, that unraveling prior plea bargains is not worth the candle, and therefore benefit only those offenders whose sentences
were not final at the time of enactment. Or, consistent with retributive principles, Congress at other times may decide to benefit solely
offenders who commit offenses after the statutory change. In short,
courts should assess the retroactivity of any ameliorative change in
punishment based on traditional factors of statutory construction,
leaving the question of retroactivity in the Legislature’s lap.

